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ABSTRACT 
The Roots of Low European Employment: Family Culture?* 
OECD countries faced largely divergent employment rates during the last 
decades. But the whole bulk of the cross-national and cross-temporal 
heterogeneity relies on specific demographic groups: prime-age women and 
younger and older individuals. This paper argues that family labour supply 
interactions and cross-country heterogeneity in family culture are key for 
explaining these stylized facts. 
First we provide a simple labour supply model in which heterogeneity in family 
preferences can account for cross-country variations in both the level and the 
dynamics of employment rates of demographic groups. Second, we provide 
evidence based on international individual surveys that family attitudes do 
differ across countries and are largely shaped by national features. We also 
document that cross-country differences in family culture cause cross-national 
differences in family attitudes. Studying the correlation between employment 
rates and family attitudes, we then show that the stronger preferences for 
family activities in European countries may explain both their lower female 
employment rate and the fall in the employment rates of young and older 
people. 
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1 Introduction
OECD countries faced highly contrasted employment patterns over the last three decades. But
this cross-national heterogeneity is mainly concentrated on particular demographic groups. Ac-
tually, Figure 1 shows that the employment rate of prime-age men has been quite similar across
countries since 1970.1 In contrast, the employment rates of younger people, prime-age women
and older people display signi…cant cross-country variations. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that
OECD countries also di¤er in the evolution pattern of the employment rates of demographic
groups. All OECD countries have undergone the same steady rise in female employment rates
and a slight decrease in prime-age male employment rates. But while the employment rates
of younger and older individuals have remained quite stable in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian
countries, they both have dramatically fallen in Continental and Mediterranean countries.
To the best of our knowledge, there is still no framework that explains such stylized facts
which lie at the heart of the cross-country di¤erences in aggregate employment rates over the
last decades. The aim of this paper is to …ll this gap. We argue that the key to understanding
these stylized facts lies in family attitudes and labor supply interactions between the di¤erent
generations of family members.
To that end, we provide a simple labor supply model that accounts for relations within the
nuclear family and the extended family. In this framework, stronger preferences for nuclear and
extended family relations lower the labor supply of women, younger and older people. Moreover,
we show that an exogenous shock to the household production of women - such as the observed
fall in the price of household durable goods - may have di¤erential impact on the labor supply
of each family members that depends on the extent of family relations. Following Greenwood
et al. (2005), we relate the rise in female participation observed in all OECD economies to an
exogenous decline in the price of durable goods used in household production. Speci…cally, this
drop in the price of household durable goods allows women to substitute waged work to home
production. The decline in the price of household durable goods also increases home production.
Then, assuming that family activities2 are complementary to home production, all the members
of the family have incentives to spend more time in family activities. This latter e¤ect is more
important when individuals are strongly attached to family activities. Therefore, the higher the
weight put on family relations, the higher is the decline in the labor supply of younger and older
individuals when prime-age female labor supply rises.
1 This paper is focused on employment rates, but our results still hold for participation rates.
2 We distinguish home production from family activities made up of leisure time that family members spend
together.
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The empirical relevance of the model is then tested on international micro and macro data.
We …rst document that people living in di¤erent OECD countries do signi…cantly di¤er with
respect to their family attitudes. To that end, we use international social surveys on family values
and relations (theWorld Value Survey and the International Social Survey Program) which cover
the main OECD countries over the last two decades. These surveys allow us to disentangle the
role played by individual characteristics and country …xed e¤ects on family attitudes. Second, we
show that these speci…c national family attitudes are highly correlated with the employment rates
of the di¤erent demographic groups by running estimations on aggregate OECD data over the
last two decades. This correlation pattern is generally robust to the inclusion of traditional time-
varying labor market institutions and other country …xed e¤ects which could account for other
cross-country di¤erences in institutions.3 We also stress that accounting for family attitudes is
promising for understanding the dynamics of employment rates. By gathering a new database
on the prices of household durable goods for an extensive set of OECD countries over the last
two decades and controlling for labor market institutions, we …nd that the drop in the price of
household durable goods has had stringent di¤erential impacts on demographic groups across
countries. This fall has been signi…cantly correlated with the rise in female employment rates
in all countries, consistently with Greenwood et al. (2005) results. But this e¤ect goes beyond
the nuclear family and signi…cantly reduces the labor supply of younger and older individuals
in Mediterranean and Continental countries while there is no evidence of such an interaction in
Nordic or Anglo-Saxon countries.
This …nding suggests that labor supply interactions within the nuclear and the extended
family are a key element for understanding the evolution pattern of employment rates.4 From
this perspective, if low employment in Europe originates in speci…c family culture5 widely shared
by a majority of the population, the European employment strategy6 which aims at increasing
the employment rate of women, younger and older people, may be inadequate as it might try to
marketize services (such as child care or Sunday family meal for instance) that people prefer to
produce at home. Accordingly, it is important to know whether the correlation between family
3 Our approach does not aim at dismissing the in‡uence of institutions on employment. We rather stress the
in‡uence of family attitudes that has been much less analyzed by economists. We view our paper as a step towards
a more complete analysis that accounts for interactions between institutions, family attitudes and employment.
4 According to Rogerson (2003) and Freeman and Shettkat (2005), the deterioration of the European employ-
ment rates relatively to the US comes from the higher weight put on home production in European countries.
Blanchard (2004) provides a similar argument based on higher preference for leisure in European countries. But
these explanations leave unexplained why only youth and elderly employment rates have dramatically fallen while
female employment rates have steadily increased in European Continental and Mediterranean countries.
5 By family culture, we mean common preferences for family rules, roles, habits, activities, and/or common
household skills for home production.
6 The European employment strategy is presented at: http://europa.eu.int/index_en.htm.
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attitudes and employment outcome can be interpreted as a relation where family culture causes
employment outcomes.
The last contribution of the paper is thus an attempt at uncovering the causal link at work
in the correlation between country speci…c family attitudes and employment patterns. It may
be argued that heterogeneity in national family attitudes only mirrors heterogeneity in national
institutions. To that regard, traditional explanations putting the emphasis on labor market
rigidities and competition between demographic groups on the labor market may explain both
employment rates7 and family attitudes.8 In other words, the causality could go only from
institutions to employment rates and family attitudes. We thus go one step further by providing
some empirical evidence that national family attitudes are shaped by cultural primitives. In
particular, we show that people facing a priori the same economic environment by living in the
same country - but who di¤er by the national origin of their ancestors - do have signi…cantly
di¤erent family attitudes, even after controlling for all their relevant socioeconomic individual
characteristics.9 Moreover, their family attitudes are perfectly in lines with those currently
expressed in their country of origin.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays some stylized facts about the employ-
ment rates of di¤erent demographic groups for 19 OECD countries over the period 1970-2003.
The labor supply model used to explain the employment participation of both prime age men,
prime age women, young and old people is presented in section 3. Empirical evidence on the
relation between family attitudes and employment rates are analyzed in section 4. Section 5
o¤ers some concluding comments.
7 Bertola et al. (2004) and Wasmer (2001) argue that labor market rigidities hinder the employment of out-
sider groups (younger, women, and older individuals) or lead to more stringent crowding out e¤ects between
demographic groups. Yet this line of inquiry leaves unexplained the dynamics of employment rates. Over the
last three decades, female employment rate has risen more in Mediterranean countries whose institutions are the
most detrimental to outsiders. Inversely, male employment rates have decreased everywhere whatever their level
of protection. Moreover the crowding out e¤ects raised by a demographic shock such as the rise in female labor
supply could be relevant in the short-run but are unlikely to persist over more than thirty years.
8 Some papers have shown that family ties are in‡uenced by the economic environment. Becker et al. (2004) and
Fogli (2002) analyze the in‡uence of job insecurity on youth emancipation decisions. Ermisch (1999), Martinez-
Granados and Ruis-Castillo (2002), Gianelli and Monfardini (2003) and Diaz and Guillo (2004) stress the impor-
tance of the access to housing.
9 This type of empirical strategy has been used by Reimers (1985), Blau (1992), Carroll et al. (1999), Antecol
(2000), Guinnane et al. (2002), Giuliano (2004) and Fernandez and Fogli (2005). Blau (1992) and Guinnane et
al. (2002) examine whether the fertility of immigrants di¤ers from that of the native born in the US. Reimers
(1985) and Antecol (2000) study the e¤ect of the country of origin on the labor force participation of immigrants.
Using the same approach, Giuliano (2004) focuses on family leaving arrangements and Fernandez and Fogli (2005)
analyze female labor participation and fertility. Caroll et al. (1999) uses this approach for the analysis of saving
behavior. All these studies …nd some signi…cant in‡uence of the cultural background on behaviors and economic
outcomes.
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Figure 1: OECD employment rates by demographic groups over the period 1970-2003. Source:
OECD
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2 Stylized facts
We begin by the main stylized facts concerning the employment rates of OECD countries over
the last decades. The analysis covers the period 1970-2003 for 19 countries: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. In this realm, it is well known that
Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries are nowadays good performers whereas Continental European
and Mediterranean countries are much less e¢cient. As of 2003, the employment rate of the
15-64 years old population reaches 73.2% in Nordic countries, 71.4% in Anglo-Saxon countries,
but only 64.8% and 55.1% in Continental-European and Mediterranean countries respectively.10
Yet we show that the main cross-country and cross-temporal variations are concentrated on
speci…c demographic groups.
2.1 Dispersion of employment rates
Table 1 indicates that the cross-national dispersion of prime-age male employment rates is much
smaller than di¤erences in the employment rates of other demographic groups, such as prime-
age women and younger and older people. Raw 2 in Table 1 indicates that the coe¢cient of
variation (equals to the standard deviation over the mean) of prime age male employment rate
over the whole period 1970-2003 is very small. It is about twenty times as small as the coe¢cient
of variation at stakes for the other demographic groups, whose dispersion of employment rates
is very close during this period.
Table 1: Employment rates in 19 OECD countries over the period 1970-2003. Source: OECD.
Employment rate 15-64 Male 25-54 Female 25-54 15-24 55-64
(1) Mean 1970-2003 (%) 64.16 88.81 59.12 48.94 46.59
(2) Coe¢cient of variation 1970-2003 (%) 1.57 0.33 6.87 6.44 6.86
(3) Mean 1970 (%) 64.65 94.57 50.36 56.88 53.94
(4) Coe¢cient of variation 1970 (%) 1.01 0.05 6.62 2.83 5.11
(5) Mean 2003 (%) 67.38 86.76 70.36 44.88 49.43
(6) Coe¢cient of variation 2003 (%) 0.83 0.06 1.34 8.35 5.93
The third and …fth raws of Table 1 show that global employment rate increased by about
3 percentage points between 1970 and 2003. However, this global rise hides very di¤erent
time-series employment patterns for the di¤erent demographic groups. On average, the relative
10 The countries belonging to each cluster are: Anglo-Saxon (Australia, Canada, UK and US), European con-
tinental (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands), Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and
Nordic (Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden).
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employment incidence of prime-age women rose steadily by 20 percentage points. Meanwhile,
all the other demographic groups faced employment drops: 8 percentage points for prime-age
men, 12 percentage points for younger people and 4 percentage points for older people.
It is also clear from raws 4 and 6 in Table 1 that the cross-country variation in prime-age
male employment rates is much smaller than that of the other groups. In 2003, the coe¢cient
of variation for the 25-54 years old men is more than 20 times as small as the coe¢cient of
variation of prime-age women, 140 times as low as that of younger people and 98 times as
low as the coe¢cient of variation for older people. Looking at the cross-temporal evolution in
employment rates, it turns out that the coe¢cient of variation has decreased for women but has
signi…cantly increased for younger people (and to a lesser extent for older individuals) during
the last decades. This evolution suggests a convergence in prime-age female employment rate
concomitant to a divergence in the employment rates of younger and older individuals.
Accordingly, Table 1 makes plain that the whole di¤erences in global employment rates
across OECD countries stem from di¤erences in the employment rates of speci…c demographic
groups, namely prime-age women, and younger and older people. Moreover, the broad picture
displayed by Table 1 suggests that the employment rates of these demographic groups evolved
very di¤erently: women participate more and more in the labor market while the other groups
tend to be less and less employed.
2.2 The universal rise in female employment rates
Not only female employment rate did increase on average over the period 1970-2003 but it
increased everywhere. Figure 2 displays the annual growth rate of female prime-age employment
rate for each 19 OECD countries. It appears that this growth rate has been positive on average in
each country, the rise being sharper in Ireland and Mediterranean countries. Yet cross-country
comparison in level reveals that prime-age female employment rate remained much lower in
Mediterranean countries than in Nordic and Continental European countries all over the period.
Figure 3 illustrates this point for the year 2003. On average, 80 percent of prime-age women
are employed in Nordic countries. This rate falls to approximately 70 percent in Continental
European and Anglo-Saxon countries. And Mediterranean countries lag far behind with a prime-
age female employment rate no higher than 60 percent.
Thus when looking at female employment rate, two stylized facts emerge: i) a common
rise in female employment rates in all countries over the last decades; ii) a persistent cross-
country heterogeneity in the level of employment rates. Most researches on female labor-market
participation generally focus on the second stylized fact and put the blame on detrimental labor
market or family policies. But this explanation is hardly compatible with the …rst stylized fact.
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Figure 2: Annual rate of growth of prime age female employment rate in 19 OECD countries
over the period 1970-2003.
The rise in female labor supply has been sharper precisely in Mediterranean and European
Continental countries where institutions are usually said to be the most detrimental to female
participation (Bertola et al., 2002).
2.3 Diverse experiences for prime age men, younger and older people
Whereas the female employment rate increased in all OECD countries, this is far from being the
case for the other demographic groups.
Looking at prime-age men …rst, Figure 4 shows that their employment rates decreased almost
everywhere. But a comparison of Figures 2 and 4 also reveals that cross-national di¤erences in
the growth rate of prime-age male employment rates are much smaller than that of women.
This picture contrasts with the labor market outcomes of younger individuals. Figure 5
shows that OECD countries faced very di¤erent changes in youth employment rates, the annual
growth rate varying from -2 percent to 0.7 percent. This heterogeneity has had sizeable e¤ects in
the long-run. Let us compare France and the US as a textbook example to illustrate this point.
The two countries started from approximately the same youth employment rate in 1970, around
52 percent. But while youth employment rate slightly increased over the period at an annual
rate of .02 percent in the US, it dramatically fell at an annual rate of 1.4 percent in France. As
a consequence , French youth employment rate lagged far behind its American counterpart with
a level of 30 percent against 53 percent in the US in 2003. More generally, youth employment
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Figure 3: Prime age female employment rate in 2003. Source: OECD.
rate has decreased sharply in almost all European Continental and European countries while it
has remained quite stable or has slightly increased in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries.
The employment patterns of older individuals o¤er a mirror image to that of the young gener-
ation. Figure 6 shows that OECD countries also faced very di¤erent changes in the employment
incidence of older people. While their employment rates rose in almost all Anglo-Saxon and
Nordic countries such as Denmark and the United Kingdom, they dramatically decreased in
Continental European and Mediterranean countries such as France, Germany, Spain, Italy and
Greece. Once again the comparison France - US is quite instructive. The employment gap for
individuals aged between 55 and 64 years old has sharply widen from 5 percentage points to 25
percentage points over the period.
These stylized facts suggest that countries which have been able to keep high employment
rates for younger people are also those that had good performances for older people. Figure 7
provides evidence on this strong positive cross country-correlation between the growth rate of
the employment rates of young and older people. Countries like Denmark and Norway managed
to increase employment for both the young and the old generations, whereas France, Germany
and Spain had bad records for both populations.
As a preliminary conclusion, it appears that the evolution of OECD employment rates over
the last thirty years is characterized by an universal increase in female employment rate and much
more diverse experiences concerning the other demographic groups. As of 2003, countries with
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Figure 4: Annual rate of growth of prime age male employment rate in 19 OECD countries over
the period 1970-2003.
low aggregate employment rates have been unable to su¢ciently raise the entry of women into
the labor market to catch up the high female employment rate of Nordic countries. Moreover,
countries which faced low female employment rates also su¤ered from the exit of younger and
older people out of employment. Accordingly, the two questions that have to be addressed in
order to explain the cross-country di¤erences in employment rates over the last thirty years are:
i) Why is the prime-age female employment rate still low in some countries despite its rise
common to all countries?
ii) Why did the employment rate of younger and older people decreased in some countries
and not in others?
3 The Model
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework that allows us to explain the uni-
versal increase in the labor supply of prime-age women and the declining participation of other
demographic groups in some countries over the last thirty years.
This framework highlights the di¤erential impact of the observed decline in the relative price
of household durable goods on the labor supply of the di¤erent demographic groups observed
over the last decades. Such a decline has allowed women to substitute household durable goods
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Figure 5: Annual growth rate of youth employment rate in 19 OECD countries over the period
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to housework in the production of home goods. Accordingly, women have been able to enter
into the labor market and to devote more time to leisure. Moreover, the drop in the household
durable goods price in‡uences the labor supply of other demographic groups through its impact
on the production of home goods. Assuming that family activities and home production are
complementary, increased home production triggered by the decline in the price of household
durable goods creates incentives to devote more time to family activities, this e¤ect being more
important in economies in which individuals are strongly attached to family values.
This model allows us to incorporate in a simple framework the interactions between tech-
nology and family preferences. These two elements are generally considered as the main deter-
minants of the increase in female labor market participation but are treated separately in the
literature. Galor and Weil (1996) and Greenwood et al. (2005) argue that the rise in female
labor force participation is due to technological shocks either on waged labor, with a change in
the nature of jobs, or in the home sector, with the emergence of engines of liberation for female
housework. But this technological explanation could not account by itself for cross-national
di¤erences in the level of female employment unless it assumes that such a technological shock
has been restricted to speci…c OECD countries. Other explanations stress changes in social
norms and family preferences as more and more women worked (Fernandez et al., 2004). This
line of inquiry generally puts the emphasis on within country evolution of family preferences.
We rather stress potential cross-country di¤erences in family preferences at one point in time to
document the di¤erential impact of a common shocks on national employment rates.
The nuclear family
We consider the relations between spouses within the nuclear family in a simple standard
model of the family (Bergstrom, 1997) in which we make the distinction between time devoted
to home production, to family activities, to personal leisure and to waged work. The preferences
of the nuclear family are represented by the utility function
u(c; `m; `f ; f) = lnc +¸f ln `f +¸m ln`m + Á lnF;
where c stands for consumption of a numeraire good purchased in the market; `f and `m denote
female and male personal leisure respectively, F represents a “family good”. The parameters i¸
(i = f; m) and Á re‡ect the weight put on individual leisure and the family good respectively
(¸i > 0, Á > 0) .
The family good is a composite of a good produced at home in quantity cH; and leisure time
that spouses spend together in family activities. Speci…cally
F = min(cH ; ¹f sf ;¹msm); (1)
12
where sf and sm denote respectively the amount of time devoted by women and men to joint
family activities. ¹f > 0 and ¹m > 0 are two parameters.
This formulation captures in a simple way the idea that there is a complementarity between
home production and time that spouses devote together to family activities. Typically the time
spent cooking at home is only valuable to the extent that the two spouses spend time to enjoy
the resulting meal. Moreover this formulation allows us to extend the traditional literature by
distinguishing personal leisure from family activities. This point might be key for understanding
the EU-US employment gap. By ignoring this distinction, recent researches assume that the
widening of the EU-US employment gap is only due to a shock in the preference for leisure
(see Blanchard, 2004). Yet this shift towards non-work time could hide di¤erent non-market
activities such as family activities. Naturally, this distinction is not neutral in terms of policy
recommendations.11
Goods are produced in the home thanks to household durables k and to female labor hf :
The production function reads
cH =
·
´h
¾¡1
¾
f +(1 ¡ ´)k
¾¡1
¾
¸ ¾
¾¡1
; ´ 2 [0; 1] ; (2)
where ¾ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between female time spent to housework and
household durable goods.
Total time is normalized to unity for each individual. Female leisure equals total time, minus
hours worked in the market, denoted by mf ; minus hours worked in the home, denoted by hf ;
and minus hours spent with the spouse, denoted by sf : That is
`f = 1 ¡mf ¡hf ¡ sf : (3)
Male leisure equals total time minus hours worked in the market and hours spent with the spouse
`m = 1 ¡mm ¡ sm: (4)
The budget constraint of the nuclear family reads
c + pk + wm(`m + sm)+ wf (`f + hf + sf) · wf + wm + R ´ W; (5)
where p is the price of the household durable good and R stands for non labor income.
The maximization problem of the nuclear family reads
maxfc;;k;hf ;sf ;sm;`f ;`mg lnc + ¸f ln`f +¸m ln`m+ Á ln F;
11 Freeman and Schettkat (2005) have stressed the empirical relevance of the distinction of non-market activities
for understanding the EU-US employment gap. They distinguish four categories: market work, household work,
leisure and personal time. They show that countries di¤er much more on household work rather than leisure.
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subject to (1), (2), (5) and hf ¸ 0; sf +hf + `f · 1; sm + `m · 1; k ¸ 0:12
The …rst-order conditions for interior solutions can be written as
`i =
¸i
1 + ¸f +¸m +Á
W
wi
; i = f;m;
hf =
WÁ (1 + ¸f + ¸m+ Á)¡1
p1¡¾
³
(1¡´)
´ wf
´¾
+ wf +
³
wf
¹f
+ wm¹m
´·
´
³
wf
p
´¾¡1
+ (1 ¡ ´)
¸ ¾
¾¡1
;
si =
WÁ¹¡1i (1 +¸f + ¸m + Á)
¡1h
(1 ¡ ´)¾p1¡¾+ ´¾w1¡¾f
i ¾
¾¡1 +
³
wf
¹f +
wm
¹m
´; i = f;m:
According to these equations, our model yields the following main predictions. First, fe-
male housework hf increases with the price of the durable household good p if the elasticity of
substitution between female housework and durable household good is su¢ciently high. More
precisely, it turns out that female housework increases with p if ¾ > 1: Next, time devoted to
family activity si always decreases with the price of durable household goods. This result is due
to the complementarity between home production and family activity. The higher the price of
household durable goods p, the lower is the household production cH , and the lower the time
devoted by the two spouses devote to family activities.
As a consequence, the e¤ect of household durable prices on the female time devoted to home
production and family activity (hf+sf ) is a priori ambiguous. But it can be checked that there
exists a threshold value of the elasticity of substitution, denoted by ¹¾; above which total time
spend by women for family increases with p: Eventually, leisure, `i; does not depend on the price
of the durable household good in this simple setting.
Accordingly, this model shows that the drop in the price of durable household goods p that
occurred in the OECD countries may explain the rise in female labor supply and the decrease
in male labor supply in a framework in which i) the elasticity of substitution between durable
household goods and female homework is higher than ¹¾ and ii) family activity and the good
produced in the home are complementary.
The model also predicts that more inclination for the “family good” (corresponding to higher
values of Á) decreases the labor supply of both women and men. However, the impact on the
labor supply of women is bigger because they devote more time to housework and to family
activities whereas men spend more of their time in family activities only. Moreover, the absolute
value of the derivative of female labor supply with respect to the price of household goods
increases with Á: This property may explain that women work less but that their labor supply
12 The utility function implies that the constraints c ¸ 0; `m ¸ 0; `f ¸ 0; sf ¸ 0; sm ¸ 0 are never binding.
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is more responsive to changes in the prices of the durable household goods in countries in which
individuals have stronger preferences for family activities.
The extended family
The members of the extended family are young adults and older people. They bene…t from
interactions with the nuclear family which allow them to consume a share " 2 [0;1] of the good
produced in the home of the nuclear family.13 We assume that nuclear family members derive
the same utility from their own consumption as from the consumption of the extended family
members up to the share ": Thus this share enters into the utility of the nuclear family in the
same way as the other part of the consumption. From this point of view, the parameter " can
be interpreted as the intensity of the extended family ties.
Preferences of young adults and older people are represented by the utility function14
v(c"; `"; f") = ln c" + ¸" ln `" + Á" lnF";
where c" denotes the consumption of the marketable good, `" stands for leisure and F" is the
“family good”. The parameters ¸" > 0 and Á" > 0 capture the weight put on individual leisure
and the family good respectively. The de…nition of the family good is similar to that of the
nuclear family. Speci…cally
F" = min("cH ;¹"s"); (6)
where cH is the consumption of the good produced at the the nuclear family’s home and s"
is the time devoted to family activities. To keep the model simple, we neglect potential home
production by the members of the extended family.
The maximization problem of a member of the extended family reads
max
fc" ; "` ;s"g
ln c" + ¸" ln`" + Á" lnF";
subject to the budget constraint
c" +w"(`" + s") · w" + R" ´ W";
and to the constraints (6) and s" + `" + m" · 1:15 The parameters w" and R" denote the wage
and the non labor income of the extended family members respectively.
13 Introducing the possibility that members of the extended family also bene…t from a share of the marketable
good purchased by the nuclear family would keep unchanged the results obtained below.
14 For the sake of simplicity, we do not distinguish potential di¤erences in the valuation of leisure derived by
the family members.
15 The utility function implies that the constraints c" ¸ 0; `" ¸ 0; s" ¸ 0 are never binding.
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The labor supply of the members of the extended family is given by the following …rst-order
conditions
m" =
8<: max
n
1 ¡ ( "¸+Á")1+ "¸+Á" W"w" ; 0
o
if ¹"Á"1+¸"+Á"
W"
w" · "cH ;
max
n
1 ¡ ¸"1+¸"W"w" ¡ "cH(1+¸")¹" ; 0
o
otherwise.
It follows that the labor supply of young adults and older individuals decreases with the
share " of the home production they can get. Moreover, a drop in the price of the durable
household good also decreases their labor supply since home production increases and they can
devote more time to family activities.
The predictions of the model can be illustrated by simple calibration exercises reported in
Figures 8 and 9. The values of the parameters are chosen as follows: wf = 1; wm = 1:2;
w" = 1;¸m = ¸f = 0:1; ¸" = 1;R = R" = 0;¹m = ¹f = 10;¹" = 2; ¾ = 3; ´ = 0:7;Á" =
:3; " = :5: Wage values have been chosen to reproduce the average wage gap between men, on
one hand, and women and members of the extended family, on the other hand, observed in
OECD countries, which is about 20%. The non labor incomes are assumed to be equal to zero
for the sake of simplicity. The values of i¸, ¹i and ´ allow us to reproduce the average OECD
participation rates of the di¤erent demographic groups and the share of household durable goods
in total household expenditures in 2003 (which is about 8 percent in OECD countries according
to Eurostat) for an intermediate value of Á = 0:3: Then, we choose a plausible value of the
elasticity of substitution ¾ that allows us to reproduce the typical changes in male and female
labor market participation for a 50 percent drop in the price of the household durable good p
in countries with strong (Á = 0:5) and weak (Á = 0:1) preferences for the family good. Last, the
values of Á" and " allow us to match the evolution of the market participation of younger and
older people as members of the extended family.
Figure 8 displays the consequence of a decline in the price of the durable household goods
on prime-age female and prime-age male labor supplies as a function of preferences for family
activities. It entails a small decrease in prime-age male labor market participation (ranging
between 86 percent and 84 percent) whatever the preference for family activities. However, the
change in female labor supply is much more contrasted. The implied rise in prime-age female
labor supply is much steeper when there is a strong preference for family activities (Á = 0:5),
going from 51 percent to 60 percent. In contrast, the increase in prime-age female labor supply
is largely softened by weak family preferences (Á = 0:1), ranging from 75 percent to 78.5 percent.
Figure 9 looks at the e¤ects of a similar decline in the price of the household durable goods
on the labor supply of the extended family. While the labor supply of the extended family
members remains quite stable in economies with low preferences for family, it dramatically falls
in economies putting a high weight on family.
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Figure 8: Female (continuous lines) and Male (dotted lines) labor supply with strong (left-hand
side panel) and weak (right-hand side panel) preferences for the family good.
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Figure 9: Labor supply of the members of the extended family with strong (continuous line)
and weak (dotted line) preferences for the family good (Á = 0:5 and Á = 0:1 respectively).
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Figure 10: Female labor supply (continuous lines) and labor supply of the members of the
extended family with strong family ties (" = 0:9) and weak family ties (" = 0:1).
Figure 10 shows that our model can also account for similar changes in female employment
rates concomitant to di¤erent changes in the employment rates of younger and older people.
This can be seen by looking at the in‡uence of family ties on the response of the labor supply
of the extended family members to the decline in the price of durable household goods. When
family ties are strong (" = 0:9; the value of Á" being equal to 0:3 in both cases considered in
Figure 10), the right-hand side panel of Figure 10 shows that the rise in female labor supply
is compatible with is a 6 percentage points drop in the labor supply of the members of the
extended family. By contrast, when family ties are weak (" = 0:1), the same rise in female labor
supply is concomitant to a 0.6 percentage point drop in the labor supply of the members of the
extended family. From this point of view, our model allows us to explain why the US on one
hand, and some Continental European countries such a Germany and France, on the other hand,
had similar changes in female employment rate over the three last decades and very contrasted
changes in employment rates of younger and older workers.
As a conclusion, this model predicts three main e¤ects of a fall in durable good prices on
the family labor supply: i) female labor supply increases, ii) male labor supply decreases and
iii) the labor supply of young adult and senior decreases. Moreover, the size of the variations
in labor supply depends on i) the preference Á for family and ii) the strength of family ties
between the nuclear family and the members of the extended family measured by ". If the
nuclear family members put a higher weight on the family good (Á large), a fall in the price
of durable household goods entail a stronger increase in female labor supply and in household
production. This rise in home production leads to a larger reduction in the labor supply of the
extended family members, this e¤ect being ampli…ed by the importance of the extended family
ties measured by the parameter ":
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The following part of the paper provides some empirical evidence which support these pre-
dictions.
4 Empirical evidence
This section assesses the link between family attitudes and employment patterns of OECD
countries over the last three decades. First, we stress that individuals living in di¤erent countries
highly di¤er regarding attitudes towards prime-age people, and younger and older individuals,
within the family and on the labor market. We also provide some elements indicating that cross-
country di¤erences in family perceptions originate in cross-country di¤erences in family culture.16
We then show that national family attitudes are highly correlated with the employment rates
of the di¤erent demographic groups over the period, even after controlling for other potential
country speci…c e¤ects and time-period shocks. Eventually and consistently with the predictions
of the labor supply model, we show that di¤erences in national family attitudes are signi…cantly
correlated with the cross-national variation in the responses of the demographic employment
rates following a common drop in the price of household durable goods.
4.1 International heterogeneity in family culture
This section documents to what extent people living in di¤erent OECD countries di¤er in their
family perceptions. We then provide some evidence that these cross-national di¤erences in family
perceptions are deeply rooted in national family cultures.
First, we probe into attitudes towards the role of young individuals, old individuals and
prime-age men and women within the family and on the labor market.17 To that end, we use in-
ternational surveys on individual values: the World Value Survey (WVS) and the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The WVS covers four waves (1981-1984, 1990-93, 1995-1997,
1999-2002) and provides key questions on family attitudes. The ISSP complements these infor-
mations with speci…c surveys on gender roles and family relations since the mid-eighties. For the
sake of comparison, our analysis will be restricted to the same 19 OECD countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and USA.
16 Some papers have also documented that there are di¤erences in attitudes within countries. Azmat et al.
(2004) found an e¤ect on female unemployment rates of attitudes to female work at regional level even when
including country …xed e¤ects.
17 Recent studies have stressed cross-national variation in the allocation of time between market and home ac-
tivities (Freeman and Schettkat, 2004). We complement this line of inquiry by laying stress directly on preferences
and distinguishing the role played by each demographic groups in this realm.
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This …rst step allows us to show that there is a strong cross-country heterogeneity in family
attitudes, even after controlling for observed individual heterogeneity. This …nding raises the
issue of the interpretation of such an heterogeneity. It can be the case that individuals express a
traditional perception of family, according to which women should stay at home to raise children
for instance, because they live in countries in which institutions are detrimental to female waged
labor. In other words, does cross-country heterogeneity in family attitudes originate in cross-
country heterogeneity in economic environments only? Or is this cross-country heterogeneity
also ingrained in di¤erent national family culture, namely in heterogeneity in preferences for
family ties and/or in household skills for home production? We shed some light on this issue
by using direct information on the attitude of individuals living in the same country but whose
ancestors came from di¤erent countries.
4.1.1 Attitudes towards nuclear family
We examine attitudes towards the nuclear family by looking at the perception of gender roles
and parenthood.
Gender roles
We …rst consider the cross-national heterogeneity in the perception of gender roles on the
labor market and within the family. Our primary interest lies in attitudes towards gender
division of labor captured by the following questions: “When jobs are scarce, men should have
more rights to a job than women” (WVS) and “Family life su¤ers if women wok full time”
(ISSP).18 The …rst question is followed by the scale: “agree, neither, disagree”. The answers to
the other question are ranged between: “strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree”.
To evaluate potential cross-national speci…cities in family attitudes, we make use of two in-
dicators. The …rst one is based on average national preferences by reporting the mean reply to
each question. Yet this naive indicator might capture heterogeneity in individual characteristics
rather than national features. To overcome this ‡aw, we run ordered probit estimation for each
question by controlling for the main individual characteristics and by including country-…xed
e¤ects which capture the role of speci…c national features. Regarding individual characteristics,
we take into account the age and age squared, the level of education measured as the number of
years in school, the marital status, the number of children, the family income coded by the sur-
veys between low, middle and high incomes, and the employment status. Moreover, we control
18 We checked that answers to other related questions yield similar results. These questions are: “If a woman
earns more money than her husband, it is almost certain to cause problems” (WVS), “A university education is
more important for a boy than a girl” (WVS), “Man’s job is to earn money, wife’s job is look after home and
family” (ISSP).
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for the political a¢liation coded by the surveys between left, center and right wings. We also
include the religious a¢liation by distinguishing the following main categories: Catholic, Protes-
tant, Buddhist, Muslim, Jews, other religions and without any religion. All the estimations are
based on the working age population between 16 and 64 years old.
Results are reported in Figure 11 for the available surveys in the nineties. The x-axis shows
the mean reply at the country-level to each question. The basic picture is that of a great
deal of heterogeneity across countries. On average Mediterranean countries, Japan, and to a
lesser extent Continental European countries, put a much higher weight on gender division
of labor within the family compared to Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries. To give a
hint of such variation, we re-scale the former question between 0-1 for (strongly) disagree and
(strongly) agree. It turns out that in Japan, a majority of 57.1 percent of people do agree
with job priority for men. The Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and
the Continental European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands) come
next with 41.2 percent and 39.3 percent of agreement respectively. In the other Anglo-Saxon
countries (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United States) and Nordic countries, this share
of agreement sharply falls to 21.2 percent and 11.5 percent.
The y-axis reports the contribution of the speci…c country …xed e¤ects to individual answers.
The …gure suggests that individual attitudes towards gender role is overwhelmingly shaped by
national speci…cities. The correlation between the mean-reply and the country …xed e¤ects is
almost perfect, yielding a coe¢cient of determination equal to 0.9. Moreover, Table 2 reports
that all country-…xed e¤ects are statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level in explaining
attitudes towards gender roles. Regarding individual characteristics, the male breadwinner
values are highly positively correlated with the number of children and the fact to be a man, to
be married, to lean to the right wing and to belong to Catholic or Muslim denominations. In
contrast, traditional gender role values are signi…cantly negatively correlated with the level of
education and to a lesser extent with the level of income.
Parenthood
A second important issue is whether di¤erences in attitudes towards the nuclear family is
driven by the representation of motherhood. This point is critical in as much as it could be
linked to the observed cross-country heterogeneity in family policies and in gender employment
gap (Jaumotte, 2003). We address this issue by using the two following questions: “A child
needs both a mother and a father at home to grow up happily” (WVS), “A preschool child su¤ers
if the mother works” (ISPP). The former question is available for the four waves of the WVS.
The latter one is provided by ISPP for two speci…c waves on family attitudes in 1994 and 2002.
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Figure 11: Gender roles in OECD countries.
Figure 12 replicates the same exercise as before by plotting the mean response against the
country-…xed e¤ects concerning the two latter questions in the nineties and early 2000’s. The
picture is still that of a great cross-country heterogeneity mainly driven by national speci…cities,
the correlation between the mean-reply and the …xed e¤ects being close to one. To give a
hint of such national variation, we group the answers into two categories: agree and disagree
and use the same regional clusters as before. On average, the group of Mediterranean and
Continental countries do agree at 90 percent with the statement “A child needs both a mother
and a father at home to grow up happily”. This share is reduced by 20 percent point when
looking at Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries. This di¤erence becomes even sharper concerning
the second statement “A preschool child su¤ers if the mother works”. In typical Mediterranean
and Continental European countries like Italy and Germany, 72 percent and 68 percent of people
respectively share this traditional perception of motherhood. By contrast, they are no more than
38.3 percent in the United States and 30.4 percent in Sweden to back this statement. Obviously,
such discrepancies may have strong links with female employment rates as documented in the
next section.
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Table 2: Estimations of family attitudes: Ordered Probit Estimates
Job priority
for men over
women (1)
Preschool child
su¤ers if mother
works (2)
Older people
should be forced
to retire early (3)
Children should
be taught to be
independent (4)
Male
-.222**
(.024)
-.264***
(.012)
-.048**
(.023)
-.135***
(.019)
Age
-.018**
(.008)
-.011***
(.002)
-.013
(.008)
.043***
(.006)
Age2
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.000***
(.000)
Education
(in years)
.029***
(.003)
.028***
(.001)
.026***
(.002)
.025***
(.002)
Number
of child
-.046***
(.010)
-.019***
(.005)
.001
(.010)
-.042***
(.008)
Partner
-.184***
(.040)
-.023
(.015)
-.074**
(.035)
-.074**
(.029)
Employed .163
***
(.020)
.199***
(.015)
.025
(.025)
.085***
(.021)
Income class:
Middle
Reference
Lower income
-.124***
(.030)
.029
(.016)
-.079***
(.029)
.016
(.025)
Upper income
.126***
(.030)
.141***
(.017)
.047
(.029)
.032
(.029)
Political orientation:
Center
Reference
Left
.108***
(.029)
.161***
(.015)
-.024
(.027)
.159***
(.023)
Right -.168
***
(.027)
-.066**
(.016)
-.005
(.026)
-.089***
(.022)
Religious a¢liation:
No_religion
Reference
Catholic -.166
***
(.036)
-.088***
(.021)
-.144***
(.035)
-.293***
(.031)
Protestant -.128
**
(.042)
-.055***
(.021)
-.010
(.040)
-.242**
(.034)
Buddhist
-.118
(.079)
.107**
(.049)
-.072
(.090)
-.245***
(.069)
Muslim -.790
***
(.208)
-.656***
(.111)
.103
(.222)
-.991***
(.204)
Jews .717
**
(.286)
-.037
(.129)
.181
(.215)
-.176
(.133)
Other_religion -.200
***
(.064)
-.242***
(.036)
-.111*
(.063)
-.348***
(.050)
Fixed e¤ects Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Adj- R2 .0934 .0610 .078 .118
Observations 13244 28544 13266 19942
A negative sign increases the likelihood that individuals agree with the statement ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
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4.1.2 Attitudes towards extended family relations
We extend our investigation on family attitudes to the role of young and elderly people within
the extended family. A number of contributions (Fogli, 2000, Bentolila and Ichino, 2000) have
stressed the cross-national variations in family arrangements between generations, in particular
regarding the leaving age of children from parental household. In the following, we complement
this line of inquiry on two grounds in order to uncover the two key parameters of the extended
family model: that is the preference for family activities and the strength of family ties. First, we
directly look at individual attitudes towards the extended family rather than family arrangement
outcomes. Second we provide new evidence on the extent to which family members share
household activities between each other.
Let us …rst focus on attitudes towards the extended family. We start by looking at potential
international di¤erences in the perceptions of older people. The WVS …rst provides some evi-
dence regarding their role on the labor market by asking the following question: “When jobs are
scarce, older people should be forced to retire from work early”. Figure 13 reports the mean-reply
against the country …xed e¤ects which still capture national values. The sample is made up of
people between 18 years old and 64 years old and is taken from the two waves 1990-93 and 1995-
97. On average, Mediterranean countries and to a lesser extent Continental European countries
are much more prone to support this statement than Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries. But
remarkably enough, this ordering is less clear-cut than before. In particular, Finland is much
closer to Mediterranean countries than its Nordic counterparts in this realm. By contrast, Japan
has the same stand on this issue as Nordic countries or the United States. This point is all the
more remarkable that the Finnish employment rate of older workers is precisely close to the
Mediterranean one while that of Japan is one of the highest among OECD countries with Swe-
den and the US. The Probit estimates of the other individual characteristics are reported in
Table 2- Col.3. The probability to agree with early retirement is positively correlated with the
fact to be a man, to have a partner or to have a low level of education.
Figure 13 also reports the family relations between prime age and older individuals captured
by the following question: “Adult children have a duty to look after their elderly parents”.
The answer are scaled between “Agree, Disagree”. Once again, there is a distinct cluster of
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain) alongside with France which back such support within
the family. In contrast, Nordic countries and Anglo-Saxon countries (with the exception of the
US) seem much less concerned by such generational links.
Regarding attitudes towards young people, the most relevant available question for our is-
sue is related to their independence and is provided by the WVS question: “Here is a list of
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qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you consider to
be really important: Independence?”. The answers are scaled between “Important, Not impor-
tant”. Following our previous strategy, Figure 13 reports the mean-reply on the x-axis against
the proxy for family attitudes yielded by country …xed e¤ects on the y-axis. The sample is still
made up of the working age population on the two waves 1990-93 and 1995-97. On average,
child independence appears to be a top quality for 75.1 percent of people in Nordic countries.
This …gure is twice as high as that of Mediterranean countries in which this quality is stressed
by only 38.2 percent of the population. This opposition pattern also holds between Anglo-Saxon
and Continental European countries. While 62 percent of American put the emphasis on child’s
independence, they are no more than 29 percent in France to follow this stand. This heterogene-
ity is largely shaped by national speci…cities. Even by controlling for standard characteristics
and cultural features such as religious a¢liation, the correlation between the mean-reply and
the country …xed e¤ects remains very high, the coe¢cient of determination being equal to 0.96.
The e¤ects of the other individual characteristics are reported in Table 2- Col.4. Promotion of
child independence is negatively correlated with the fact to be a man, to belong to the right
wing and to be either Catholic or Muslim.
Let us now turn to the relationships within the extended family. We address this issue by
using a speci…c ISSP wave on social networks run in 2001. Due to the lack of data, we focus
on four main countries representative of the main OECD clusters, namely Denmark, Germany,
Spain and the United States. We …rst provide evidence that countries strongly di¤er in the
strength of the contacts between the di¤erent family members. Figure 14-bottom left shows the
share of children between 15 and 24 years old reporting to have at least daily physical contacts
with their mother and conversely the share of elderly people having at least daily contacts with
their adult daughter. Daily contacts include living in the same home. It turns out that contacts
across generations are two times as high in Spain – and to a lesser extent in Germany – as in
Denmark and the United Sates. But countries also highly di¤er regarding the way the di¤erent
family generations share home activities. Figure 14-bottom right provides evidence on such
discrepancies by reporting the mean reply for the question: “Suppose you had to stay in bed for
a few days and needed help around the house, with shopping and so on. Who would you turn to
…rst for help?”. The answers involve relatives (husband, mother, father, daughter, son), social
relations (from workplace, neighbors, friends) and private services. An overwhelming majority
of young people would turn …rst to their mother in Spain and in Germany while they are no
more than one third to share this reaction in the United States. If the di¤erences are less
sizeable regarding the answers given by older people, the same cross-country opposition pattern
holds. These pictures suggest much stronger links between prime-age women and the other
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Figure 13: Family attitudes towards older and young people in OECD countries.
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Figure 14: Family networks in OECD countries in 2001.
members of the family in Continental and Mediterranean European countries. Accordingly, one
should expect much stronger interactions between female labor supply and that of the other
demographic groups in these latter countries.
4.1.3 Cultural foundations of family attitudes
The observation of cross-country heterogeneity in family attitudes and family relations does
not necessarily mean that individuals living in the same country share a common culture – i.e.
common preferences for family ties or common skills in household production. Living in a speci…c
country can in‡uence one’s own family perception and family relations through the channel of
the relative economic returns of family and market activities. For instance, it is well known that
child-care subsidies, paid maternity and parental leaves are more favorable to female waged work
in Nordic countries than in Mediterranean countries (Jaumotte, 2003). This situation may lead
individuals living in Mediterranean countries to declare more frequently that “preschool child
su¤ers if the mother works”. But it might be the case that individuals living in Mediterranean
countries also share a common culture which makes them more prone to traditional family
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attitudes. In this case family policies would be the outcome rather than the cause of the family
attitudes.
In order to investigate this issue, we look at the reactions of people who come from di¤erent
national origins but face the same economic environment because they live in the same country.
To that end, we use information provided by the ISSP on the ethnic or cultural backgrounds
of the respondents “From what country or part of the world did your ancestor come from? If
there is more than one country, which one of these countries do you feel closer”.19 Answers
to this question are essentially provided for countries with a rich history of immigration and in
particular for the United States on which our analysis is based.20 In order to use the maximum
number of observations, we group the di¤erent countries of origins into the following clusters:
European Continental countries (Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands), Mediterranean coun-
tries (Italy, Spain), and European Anglo countries (UK and Ireland). We also include people
whose ancestor come from Latin American (overwhelmingly made up of Mexican) since they
represent a substantial amount of the sample and can be used as a benchmark for comparing
the other clusters (they display the most traditional perception of the family). We then assess
to what extent the country of origins do matter by using dummies for each cluster. We also
control for the main socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, education, marital status, num-
ber of children, political orientation, religion) and the main economic variables captured by the
employment status.
Table 3 shows the estimation results for the question “A preschool child su¤ers if the mother
works”. 21 This question is available for the two speci…c surveys run by the ISSP on gender
roles in 1994 and 2002. The sample is made up of the working age population. Table 3 - Col.
1 shows that individuals whose ancestors come from European Continental and Mediterranean
countries or Latin America agree more frequently than those who originate from Nordic and
English countries with the statement “A preschool child su¤ers if the mother works”. Table 3
- Col. 2 reports the cross-country estimates run on the di¤erent countries belonging to the
previous clusters. The comparison of Columns 1 and 2 indicates that the ordering of the country
…xed e¤ects associated with the country of the ancestors of people living in the US is the same as
the ordering of country …xed e¤ects associated with the country where people currently live. This
suggests that individuals living in the US share some common family culture with people living
19 Unfortunately we cannot use the WVS questions on family attitudes in as much as this survey does not
document the country of origins of the ancestors.
20 The ISSP also provides some information about the ancestors’ countries of people living in Canada. The
same opposition pattern emerges between people with French and Anglo-Saxon origins. Yet this comparison may
be more biased with speci…c regional policies.
21 The other questions on gender roles - such as “Family life su¤ers when women works” or “A man’s job is to
earn money: a women’s job is to look after home and family” - yield quantitatively similar results.
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in the countries of their ancestors. Accordingly, the perception of family is not only shaped by
economic features that in‡uence the relative economic returns of family and market activities.
To some extent, the cross-country heterogeneity in family attitudes is shaped by cross country
heterogeneity in family culture. From this perspective, it is worth analyzing the link between
cross-country heterogeneity in family attitudes and cross-country heterogeneity in employment
rates.
4.2 Labor market outcomes of family attitudes
This section shows that family attitudes are highly correlated with the employment rates of
the di¤erent demographic groups in OECD countries over the period 1970-2003. We …rst stress
that the cross-national heterogeneity in family attitudes identi…ed previously is signi…cantly
correlated with the cross-country dispersion in the level of employment rates. We then show
that family perception displays a steady correlation with the dynamics of employment rates
of the di¤erent demographic groups. Moreover, in accordance with the model, we …nd that a
common exogenous shock on the price of household durable goods is correlated with contrasted
changes in the labor supply of the demographic groups depending on family attitudes. Actually,
the drop in the price of durable household goods over the last decades is signi…cantly correlated
with the rise in female labor supply in all countries. But this drop only displays a signi…cant
correlation with the labor supply of young and older people in countries with strong extended
family ties.
4.2.1 Family attitudes and employment rate levels
We start by gauging the correlation between family attitudes and the level of employment rates
of the di¤erent demographic groups. This issue is part of an emerging literature dealing with the
link between family perception and labor market participation (see Neumark and Postlewaite,
1998, Fernandez et al., 2004). But the current literature generally focuses on individual labor
supplies within the same country. We extend the analysis by looking at the cross-country
aggregate outcomes of such family attitudes. To the best of our knowledge, no attempt has
been made so far to quantify the relation between employment rates and family values in cross-
country times series. This caveat is partly due to the lack of suitable data. Indeed, we need
both cross-national and cross-temporal evidence on family attitudes to disentangle the role of
family perception from other speci…c country e¤ects. We try to …ll this gap by using the three
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Table 3: Cultural roots of family attitudes: Ordered probit estimates
Estimations on the US (1) Cross-country estimations (2)
Country of origins Country of residency
Latin America Reference
Mediterranean
.133
(.140)
.331***
(.042)
European Continental
.215*
(.122)
.478***
(.039)
European Anglo .291
***
(.110)
.937***
(.039)
Nordic
.512***
(.202)
1.084***
(.043)
Men
-.339***
(.065)
-.238***
(.016)
Age
-.021
(.011)
-.004
(.003)
Age2
.000
(.000)
-.000*
(.000)
Education
(in years)
.015
(.012)
.029***
(.001)
Number
of child
.003
(.027)
-.009
(.006)
Partner
-.066
(.073)
-.043**
(.019)
Employed
.186**
(.077)
.178***
(.019)
Political orientation: Center Reference
Left
.205***
(.077)
.190***
(.019)
Right -.128
*
(.076)
-.034*
(.020)
Religion: Protestant Reference
Catholic
.038
(.030)
-.045*
(.025)
No religion
.030
(.098)
.084***
(.026)
Other_religion
.095
(.160)
-.328***
(.048)
Income_class: Center Reference
Low
.103
(.075)
.022
(.020)
High
.128
(.083)
.174***
(.021)
Adj- R2 .0343 .0802
Nb of informations 1185 18438
A negative sign increases the likelihood that individuals
agree with the statement ***:1%, **: 5%, *: 10%
31
main waves of the World Value Survey (1981-1983, 1990-1992, 1999-2002).22
In line with the previous section, we capture national family attitudes by the remaining
country-…xed e¤ects in the ordered probit estimates of individual attitudes towards family. But
we run these estimates on each speci…c wave, which yields us di¤erent time observations for the
family perception. The key issue is to relate these family attitudes to the employment rates
at stakes during the corresponding periods. To compare stationary levels, we regress the 5-
year average value of the employment rate in the early eighties (1981-1984), the early nineties
(1990-1994) and the late nineties (1995-1999) on the country …xed e¤ects obtained from the
estimations of family attitudes (see Table 2) over the three corresponding waves.
Figure 15 provides a …rst hint on the raw correlations between national family attitudes and
employment rates in the early nineties. It …rst reports a signi…cant positive correlation between
prime-age female employment rate and the preferences over gender division of labour proxied by
the country …xed e¤ects for the question “When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights
to a job than women” (WVS). Three main groups appear. The Nordic countries are the most
opposed to male job priority and display the highest female employment rates. Anglo-Saxon
and European Continental countries seem to share both the same attitudes towards gender roles
and the same average female employment rates. Interestingly enough, a Mediterranean country
like Portugal has preferences towards gender roles much closer to Anglo-Saxon and Continental
countries and displays accordingly a pretty high female employment rate. The last group is
made up of countries with both low employment rates and a positive bias in favor of male job
priority. Typical countries belonging to this group are Italy, Greece, Ireland, Spain or Belgium
and Japan.
Figure 15 also reports a signi…cant correlation between the employment rate of older people
and national attitudes over their role on the labor market as proxied by the …xed e¤ects for
the question “When jobs are scarce, older people should be forced to retire from work early”.
The coe¢cient of determination amounts to 0:46: But interestingly enough, this correlation
does not square into the traditional opposition of countries. In particular Japan, the United
States and some Nordic countries like Sweden are strongly at odds with a forced retirement
and do have approximately the same employment rate of older people. By contrast, Finland,
which is as favorable as Continental and Mediterranean countries to early retirement, displays
the same employment rate pattern as these countries. Eventually, Figure 15 shows that the
same signi…cant correlation holds between youth employment rate and national family values
22 The wave 1995-97 displays a high number of missing data and is less exploitable. Note that the questions are
not reported for all countries at each wave. The estimates are based on unbalanced samples.
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Figure 15: Correlation between national family attitudes and employment rates in OECD coun-
tries
over their independence proxied by the country …xed e¤ects for the question: “Here is a list of
qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you consider to be
really important: Independence?”. The same opposition pattern emerges between Mediterranean
and European Continental countries characterized by both low youth employment rate and low
concern for youth independence and at the other extreme Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries
which display the exact inverse picture.
This basic picture suggests a strong cross-country correlation between national perception of
the role of each family members and their corresponding employment rates. Yet there may be
alternative reasons for the above positive partial correlation such as labor market institutions
or family policies.
In what follows, we attempt at quantifying the speci…c contribution of family attitudes by
taking account of the main variables used in the current labor market literature. We …rst control
for the most relevant time-varying institutions accounted for by Nickell et al. (2001) and Bertola
et al. (2002). Therefore, we include trade-union density, employment protection, trade-union
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coordination and the level of unemployment bene…ts in the employment rate estimations of
all demographic groups. Regarding female employment rate, we follow Jaumotte (2003) by
including family policies – proxied by the share of public spending in child care – and socio-
demographic variables captured by the Barro-Lee index of the number of years of education
of women aged between 25 and 55 years old and the share of child per women. In order
to understand youth employment, we also need to take into account the number of years of
education and subsidized education. Due to the availability of data, we focus on the level of
education by using the Barro-Lee index on the average years of school of people aged between
15 and 25 years old. Eventually, the employment rate of older workers is likely to be a¤ected by
…scal incentives to retire and the o¢cial age of retirement. We control for these characteristics
by using Blondal and Scarpetta (1997) data.23
Obviously, the employment rates of the di¤erent demographic groups are potentially in‡u-
enced by a number of other country speci…c variables. We control as far as we can for these
speci…c features by including country …xed e¤ects. Potential aggregate macroeconomic shocks
are accounted for by including time period dummies. The prime age male unemployment rate
is also included as a proxy for national labor market conditions.
Both the previous indicators and the employment rates by demographic groups are taken as
5-year average. The sub-periods correspond to that of the national family attitudes indicators:
the early eighties (1980-84), the early nineties (1990-94) and the late nineties (1995-99).
The GLS estimates are reported in Table 4. Each demographic employment rate is regressed
on the corresponding family perception indicator, that is national attitudes towards i) gender
roles in the case of prime-age female employment rate (25-54), ii) child independence for youth
employment rate (16-24) , and iii) early retirement for the employment rate of older people (55-
64). Recall that the family indicator is made up of the coe¢cients associated with the country-
…xed e¤ects in the previous estimates of family attitudes. For each question, the country of
reference is chosen as the one displaying the highest average answer in favor of male job priority
over women (Japan), early retirement of older individuals (Portugal), and low independence
for children (France). Thus a positive coe¢cient associated with the national family indicator
indicates a relative increase compared to the most “traditionalist” country in the probability to
oppose job priority for men, to oppose early retirement for older workers, and to promote child
independence.
23 We only report the estimations for the legal age of retirement for which we have enough information for the
period 1980-2000. Tax incentives are proxied by the expected increase in old-age pensions for a 55 year-old male
by working for 10 years more. This indicator yields consistent results by increasing the participation of older
worker but only covers two periods 1967 and 1995.
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Table 4 shows that for all demographic groups the corresponding national family indicator
has a statistically highly signi…cant impact on employment rates. Col. 2 and Col. 3 report that
the fact to be at odds with job priority for men or to oppose early retirement for older people
is signi…cantly positively correlated with the employment rates of women and older individuals
respectively. Besides, Col. 4 in Table 4 shows that national family attitudes relatively more
favorable to child independence are positively correlated with youth employment rate. Strikingly
enough, these national family indicators display a higher statistical power of explanation than
most of the standard labor market institutions used in the current literature.
It is also instructive to try to quantify the economic meaning of the coe¢cients at stakes.
Actually the previous coe¢cients are hardly interpretable by themselves since the family indi-
cators consist of country …xed e¤ects associated with answers coded in multiple values. To cope
with this ‡aw, we have recoded the answers to the previous questions into agree-disagree (1-0)
and run probit estimates with marginal e¤ects. In this case, the national family perception
indicators capture in each country the relative change in the probability of agreement with the
related family statements compared to the most “traditionalist” country. We then estimate the
impact of these new indicators on the employment rate of each demographic group by taking
into account the previous labor market and family policies. It turns out that a relative de-
crease in national family preferences in favor of job priority for men or early retirement for older
individuals is associated with an increase in female employment rate of 13 percent and a rise
by 4.3 percent in the employment rate of older people respectively. Conversely, an increase in
national family attitudes in favour of child independence relatively to the country which is the
most opposed to this statement would be associated with an increase of 29.5 percent in youth
employment rate. As a conclusion national family attitudes display a statistically signi…cant
and economically sizeable correlations with the employment rates of the di¤erent demographic
groups in OECD countries.
4.2.2 Family attitudes and the dynamics of employment rates
This section shows that national family attitudes are also highly correlated with the dynamic
evolution of employment rates. We examine to what extent the decline in the price of household
durable goods is correlated not only to the labor supply of women but also to the labor supply of
the extended family members. The theoretical model predicts that the rise in home production
triggered by the decline in the price of household durable goods should create incentives for
younger and older individuals to devote more time to family activities and to decrease their
labor supply. But this e¤ect is expected to be signi…cant in countries which have been previously
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Table 4: Family attitudes and employment rate levels: GLS estimates
Employment rate
Women
(1)
Employment rate
Older people
(2)
Employment rate
Young people
(3)
Family attitudes
.077***
(.002)
.019**
(.008)
.076***
(.015)
Employment protection
.005
( .005)
-.048**
( .022)
.036
(.029)
Union coordination
.034
( .021)
-.003
(.014)
-.019
(.013)
Union density
-.065
(.123)
-.228***
( .039)
.476***
(.078)
Unemployment bene…t
-.024
( .071)
-.125***
( .034)
.317***
(.045)
Unemployment rate
Prime-age men
-.922***
( .242)
-.040
( .112)
-.240***
(.018)
Children per women
-.084
(.095)
Education .032
**
(.013)
-.005
(.005)
-.006
(.006)
Family policy
.006***
(.001)
O¤. age retirement
.007***
(.001)
Period e¤ects Yes***
Fixed e¤ects Yes***
Nb of informations 49 53 53
Notes : GLS estimates with heteroskedastic errors
National family attitudes proxied by:
(1) Country Fixed e¤ects in “When jobs are scarce,men should have job priority over women”
(2) Country …xed e¤ects in “When jobs are scarce,older people should retire earlier”
(3) Country …xed e¤ects in “Children should be taught to become independent”
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found to have strong national attachment to family relations only.
To test this correlation pattern, we use cross-national evidence on the evolution of household
durable goods prices over the last decades. This dataset – constructed by Eurostat – pro-
vides yearly information on the price index of home appliances for a sample of OECD countries
since 1975.24 The index only includes household appliances intended to save labor in household
cleaning and maintenance such as vacuums, washing machines, clothes dryers, dishwasher, mi-
croovens. But it excludes furniture and audiovisual appliances.25 The relative price of home
appliances is computed as the ratio of the home appliance price index to consumer price index by
taking 1985 as the reference year. The country with enough reliable data are: Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. In all countries, the relative
price of home appliances has dramatically fallen, with an average yearly drop of 1 percent.
Table 5 reports the GLS estimates of the correlation pattern between household good durable
prices and the employment rate of young and older people. To evaluate the di¤erential impact
of the price of household durable goods depending on family relations, we group the coun-
tries into the main four clusters identi…ed in the previous analysis of national family attitudes:
Anglo-Saxon countries, European continental countries (France and Germany), Mediterranean
countries (Italy and Spain) and Scandinavian countries (Denmark). To identify the speci…c role
of household durable good price on the employment rate of young and older people, we also
include the same time-varying labor market institutions (Nickell et al, 2001) as the previous
estimations. Yet, we do not include the average level of education and the tax incentives for
retirement for which we do not have yearly information. We try to partly overcome this lack
of data by including both country …xed e¤ects and time period dummies. The regressions are
based on the period 1975-1995.
Column 1 in Table 5 …rst shows a high discrepancy in the correlation pattern between youth
employment rates and durable goods prices. There is a robust positive correlation in Mediter-
ranean and Continental countries, an increase in the home appliance price being associated with
a 0.37 percent decrease in youth employment in these groups of countries. By contrast, the cor-
relation between these two variables becomes negative and is no longer statistically signi…cant
in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries. As to the e¤ects of traditional labor institutions,
employment protection and unemployment bene…ts have a signi…cant negative impact. Column
2 in Table 5 provides a mirror image regarding the correlation between the employment rate of
24 This database has been used by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2004) for assessing the role of durable price on female
labor supply. We extend this analysis to other demographic groups and stress the key interactions between prices
and preferences.
25 Cavalcanti and Tavares (2004) used this dataset to show the signi…cant impact of the price of household
durable goods on female labor supply. We thus directly focus on the labor supply of extended family members
and their contrasted evolution by groups of countries.
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older worker and the price of household durable goods. The most noticeable result is the sizeable
positive correlation between the employment rate of this demographic group and the relative ap-
pliance price index in Mediterranean and Continental countries. The correlation is statistically
signi…cant at the 5% level. By contrast, the correlation turns out to be negative in Anglo-Saxon
and in Denmark and is no longer statistically signi…cant. This …nding suggests that the same
technological shock to home production may have led to signi…cant cross-national di¤erences in
the employment path of younger and older individuals depending on national family attitudes.
Table 5: Household durable good prices and employment rates: GLS estimates
Variables
Employment rate
Young people
(1)
Employment rate
Older people
(2)
Household durable goods prices
Anglo countries
-.114
(.073)
-.187
(.092)
Mediterranean countries
.377***
(.127)
.242**
(.102)
Continental countries
.368***
(.151)
.029***
(.001)
Scandinavian countries
-.156
(.335)
-.273
(.309)
Employment protection
-.204***
(.030)
-.042***
(.004)
Unemployment bene…t .120
***
(.037)
-.042
(.044)
Union coordination
-.018
(.015)
.002
(.024)
Union density
-.031
(.062)
-.162
(.106)
Unemployment rate
Prime-age men
-.894***
(.104)
-.001
(.001)
Constant
.311*
(.179)
.973**
( .308)
Fixed e¤ects Yes***
Time e¤ects Yes***
Nb observ. 127
GLS estimates with heteroskedastic standard errors.
*** : 1%, ** : 5% , *:10%
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5 Conclusion
Is the low European employment rate rooted in speci…c European family culture? Although this
paper is far from providing a de…nitive stand on this issue, we show converging evidence in favor
of a positive answer to this question. First, the European employment gap is overwhelmingly
concentrated on demographic groups for which the European dominant family perception is pre-
cisely unfavorable to their labor market participation. Second, the evolution of the employment
rates of the di¤erent demographic groups over the last decades has been highly correlated in
countries displaying strong preferences for family relations, the upward trend in female labor
supply having led to a dramatic fall in youth and senior employment rates in European coun-
tries only. This evolution pattern suggests strong labor supply composition e¤ects within the
family in countries which are found to be more attached to family ties. Eventually, we have
shown that family attitudes are in‡uenced by cultural factors in as much as people sharing the
same backgrounds from their ancestors but facing di¤erent economic environment tend to react
identically on family issues.
Naturally, the identi…cation of cultural factors remains a complex issue since culture may
deeply interact with institutions and evolve with the economic environement.26 As preferences
are likely to be in‡uenced by labor market experience, culture cannot be considered as an
exogenous variable out of reach from labor market institutions. Conversely, institutions also
depend on family preferences27 as far as they are shaped by individuals.
Yet we argue that deepening the cultural roots of low European employment rates remains
a top agenda issue for both positive and normative analysis of labor market outcomes. For
instance, let us consider the current European policy recommendations to promote the employ-
ment rates of mothers in European Continental and Mediterranean countries. Actually, Figure
16 shows that an overwhelming majority of women in these countries do agree (or strongly
agree) with the statement “A preschool child su¤ers if the mother works”. And it has been
shown in the core paper that this response is likely to be linked to cultural perception of moth-
erhood rather independently of policy incentives. To that regard, the implementation of the
European recommendations of the Lisbon strategy might well not be welfare improving.
26 See Bisin and Verdier (2001) for an analysis of the dynamics of preference and cultural evolution.
27 See Algan and Cahuc (2004) for a political economy analysis of job protection based on male breadwinner
values.
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